Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Public Testimony by Maurer Faculty

Faculty Scholarship

11-19-2013

The Present and Future Impact of Virtual Currency, Hearing Before
the Senate Committee on National Security and International
Trade and Finance, Subcommittee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 113th Congress
Sarah Jane Hughes
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, sjhughes@indiana.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/factestimony
Part of the Commercial Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Hughes, Sarah Jane, "The Present and Future Impact of Virtual Currency, Hearing Before the Senate
Committee on National Security and International Trade and Finance, Subcommittee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 113th Congress" (2013). Public Testimony by Maurer Faculty. 9.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/factestimony/9

This Congressional Testimony is brought to you for free
and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Public Testimony by Maurer Faculty by an
authorized administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Senate Banking Committee
Subcommittees on Economic Policy and on National Security and
International Trade and Finance

Hearing on “The Present and Future Impact of Virtual Currency”

November 19, 2013

Prepared Statement
of
Sarah Jane Hughes,
University Scholar and Fellow in Commercial Law,
Indiana University Maurer School of Law

Chairman Merkley and Chairman Warner, Ranking Members Heller and Kirk,
and Honorable Members of the Subcommittees on Economic Policy and National
Security and International Trade and Finance, I am honored to be here with you today to
discuss virtual currencies.
Monitoring the developments in virtual currencies and taking a responsible
approach to their regulation reflects their growing presence in domestic and international
transactions. Recent negative publicity associated with law enforcement action against
Silk Road and reports of the disappearance of bitcoin exchanges in China and the Czech
Republic raises important public policy concerns.
Part I: Recommendations and a Roadmap to the Balance of This Testimony
The Committee has invited testimony on a variety of subjects that I have
addressed in this prepared statement. I have a number of recommendations that pertain to
the Committee’s question.
My recommendations include:
1. Retain the current division of regulation between the States and Federal
Government – with prudential regulation of the non-depository providers of
new payments systems with the States and retaining the anti-moneylaundering, anti-terrorism and economic sanctions regulations with the
Federal Government.
2. Make providers of virtual currencies comply with the customer-identification
program and AML compliance program requirements of Sections 326 and 352
of the USA PATRIOT Act, and with the economic sanctions regulations
enforced by OFAC, just as other payments systems providers do. Virtual
currency customers will have to reveal their identities to issuers of the
currencies they use. As a corollary, customers should get the same federal
financial privacy rights that users of other payments products have under the
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 and Title V of the Gramm-LeachBliley Act.
3. Encourage FinCEN to clarify the manner in which customer-identification and
AML compliance requirements apply to virtual currencies. This is needed to
help banks ensure that they can do business with providers and users of virtual
currencies and other payments innovators. Second-stage innovations from
distributed computing and database technologies could offer benefits to
payments and commerce far beyond those that virtual currencies now offer. If
banks cannot determine how to comply with FinCEN regulations, for
example, they may continue to terminate their relationships with payments
innovators before the innovators can attract investors and users to make it to
the second-stage technologies their current work may generate.
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4. Encourage payments systems innovators to adopt and publicize transparent
payment systems rules for their own systems and even to compete for
customers on the basis of the system rules they adopt. It is too early to enact
user protections for virtual currencies.
5. Ignore the claims that
a. additional regulation of virtual currencies will halt innovations,
b. innovators deserve freedom from regulations that apply to other
payments systems and their providers, and
c. virtual currencies deserve a single federal licensure system that
preempts State prudential regulation and licensure.
6. Monitor the development of virtual currency providers in case they transform
their products into commodities or securities and, if this happens, then decide
whether regulating their products under the applicable regulations makes more
sense.
7. Leave room for non-depository and depository providers of payments
products to innovate in the virtual currency space.
8. Authorize and fund a study of virtual currencies to be carried out by the
Federal Reserve Board or pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committees Act
by an inter-agency task force and industry participants.
The balance of this statement begins in Part II with a brief history of “legal tender” and
the regulation of payments products in the United States. Part III discusses my
recommendations in some greater detail. Part IV responds to questions posed in the
Committee’s invitation to testify.

Part II: A Short History of “Legal Tender” and Governments’ Roles in Establishing it and
its Value
The emergence of a large digital “currency” unconnected to a sovereign threatens a
sovereign right recognized back to Renaissance times. In one of the earliest court
decisions involving “legal tender” – the 1605 decision in Britain of The Case of Mixed
Money 1 in which the House of Lords observed that the regulation of currency was a
sovereign right and declaring the sovereign’s right to declare “legal tender” by decree, the
affixing of the sovereign’s stamp, and to decision of the value of increments of currency
– and later to change its mind about valuation. “The prince, the stamp, and the value”
became from that point forward hallmarks of what could pass as “legal tender” that
participants in trade transactions were required by the sovereign to take from others in
satisfaction of obligations (trade or debt) they undertook. Proponents of virtual
currencies often seek to end sovereign “monopolies” over legal tender, fiat currencies.
1

The Case of Mixed Money in Ireland, Trin. 2 James I. AD 1605 [Davies’ Reports]. A key sentence from
the opinion in that case proclaimed: “that it appertaineth only to the King of England, to make or coin
money within his dominions. [2 Ro. ab. 166. 1 Co. 146, 5 Co. 114. 1 H.H.P.C. 188.]” The court also
announced its conviction that there were three attributes of “money” and “legal tender” that distinguished
them: the price, the stamp, and the value. Id.
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Contributing to the history of sovereign, stamps, and values was the rambunctious,
highly problematic period in the United States in the pre-Civil War 19th Century in which
“wild cat” banks operated. Banks issued paper notes – a form of what economists call
fiat currencies – as opposed to coins or other “specie.” Persons who took paper “bank
notes” encountered significant problems with redeeming the value that the notes were
supposed to represent. 2 They either encountered long waits while the notes moved for
collection from banks near them to distant issuers of these notes, additional long periods
while the issuing bank assembled enough funds to pay them off, or were forced to take
huge discounts from local depositary banks against the prospect of these long waits or
insolvency when the notes were eventually presented for payment to their issuing banks.
“Wild cat banking” was cited as a cause of regional recessions and of decades of
financial instability on the parts of businesses and individuals who had no other providers
of financial intermediation services close enough to their homes.
The problems associated with wild cat banks and the pressures of sustaining the
federal effort during the Civil War led Congress to create a national paper currency and
national banks in the 1860’s. 3 Eventually, the need for financial stability, including
2

See Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 252 (1864) (upholding the depositor’s right to the sum
owed on bank notes by its bank, rather than the lower value prevailing for Illinois notes of the time, which
had decreased by 50% in value during the year that collection took). “Wildcat banks” did not have reserves
sufficient to back their issues. Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL
SERVICE ACTIVITIES 17 (Thomson Reuters, 2011).
3
The Stamp Payments Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 592; Rev. Stat. 711, sect. 3583 (prohibiting circulation of bank
notes worth less than one dollar); National Currency Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (Feb. 25, 1863)
(authorizing the chartering of national banks); and the National Bank Act of 1864, act June 3, 1864, ch.
106, 13 Stat. 99, as amended (superceding the National Currency Act). The goal of these collective
National Banking Acts
… was to create a uniform national currency. Rather than have several hundred, or several
thousand, forms of currency circulating in the states, conducting transactions could be greatly
simplified if there were a uniform currency. To achieve this all national banks were required to
accept at par the banknotes of other national banks. This insured that national banknotes would not
suffer from the same discounting problem with which state banknotes were afflicted. In addition,
all national banknotes were printed by the Comptroller of the Currency on behalf of the national
banks to guarantee standardization in appearance and quality. This reduced the possibility of
counterfeiting, an understandable wartime concern.
American History from Revolution to Reconstruction and Beyond,
http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/essays/general/a-brief-history-of-central-banking/national-banking-acts-of-1863and-1864.php (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). Problems of counterfeit or altered notes caused the creation of
John Thompson’s Bank Note Detector, a precursor of the listing of counterfeit and altered notes issued
routinely by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
today. The national currency was commodity currency backed by specie (e.g., gold certificates) in place of
“greenbacks.” Eventually, as the Members know, the United States replaced commodity currency with fiat
currency in the form of Federal Reserve Notes. Proponents of virtual currencies and other followers of the
Austrian School of Economics distrust fiat currencies for their roles in business cycles and consequences of
monetary interventions reasons as explained well in the European Central Bank’s 2012 report on Virtual
Currency Schemes, virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf, at 21. The Austrian School economists also
prefer the “de-nationalization” of currency, effectively an end to governments’ monopoly on the issuance
of money. Id. These economists criticize fractional-reserve banking systems like ours, and urge the readoption of the gold standard. Id. Broome & Markham also note that as “electronic money” came into the
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stable prices, and sound monetary policy was so great as to cause Congress to establish
the Federal Reserve System. Federal authority in this arena has remained in place since
that time – through various “gold standard” debates, the creation of the Bretton Woods’
Agreement that established the current international monetary systems in the 1940’s, and
to the present. The federal government has the sole power to issue “legal tender.” 4
All of our principal trading partners also operate in national systems in which a
single, state-specified currency constitutes “legal tender” for all transactions. There is
little literature on the attitudes of our principal trading partners about “virtual currencies”
– with the exception of coverage of Canada’s development and plan to issue as “legal
tender” forms of “digital currencies known as “MintChips,” 5 and the European Central
Bank’s 2012 report on Virtual Currency Schemes. 6 Canada’s “Mint Chip” experiment
reveals no intention of abandoning the principles set forth in The Case of Mixed Money in
1605: the prince, the stamp, and the value will continue to be the province of the
sovereign. The ECB’s report, as one would expect, also favors a continuing role for
central banks and sovereign currencies.
But, just because “legal tender” exists as a fact in most developed nations, it does not
follow that individuals or businesses cannot agree to take barter or non-legal tender in
exchange for goods and services. It just dramatically increases some, primarily legal
risks in those transactions, much as we saw with “wild cat” banking in the pre-Civil War
period here, and in the disappearance of bitcoin exchanges in China and also the Czech
Republic. In these cases, the risk of engaging in virtual currency transactions currently
falls entirely on users.
We must recognize that some individuals and, apparently, an increasing number of
businesses, see value in using forms of “virtual currencies” to complete their own
transactions. 7 Can we prevent them from doing so? Probably not. Should the United
States step up their regulatory efforts in this arena? My answer is not yet, and not until
such time as stronger evidence suggests problems exist with these currencies that
contribute to financial instabilities, or otherwise enable issuers or intermediaries to
commit fraud on users or complicate monetary or other important public policies.

market in the 1990’s, commentators considered The Stamp Payments Act to bar its issuance in the nation.
Supra, note 1 at 19.
4
Congress’ authority was upheld in a series of decisions including United States v. Van Auken, 96 U.S. (6
Otto) 366 (1977); Legal Tender Cases, Know v. Lee & Parker v. Davis, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870);
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869). The federal government’s authority thus preempts the
issuance by states such as Virginia of competing currencies, as the Virginia Legislature proposed to do in
the past year.
5
Canada’s plans have revolved around a state-created digital “currency” that they call “Mint Chips.” For
more information on the status of this development, see John Greenwood, Canadian Mint ready to test its
own digital money project, FIN. POST (Canada) (Sept. 19. 2013).
6
Available at virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). (The ISBN for this report
is 9778-92-899-0862-7 (online).)
7
Media reports cite reasons such as avoiding the expense of exchange of currencies and other transaction
costs associated with use of debit or credit cards, or even checks.
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Part III: Discussion of Recommendations
Recommendation 1: Retain the current division of regulation between the States
and Federal Government – with prudential regulation of the non-depository
providers of new payments systems with the States and retaining the anti-moneylaundering, anti-terrorism and economic sanctions regulations with the Federal
Government.
The current balance between State and federal regulation affords more
opportunities to follow developments in this area with lots of eyes on these innovations,
ensure AML and economic sanctions goals are met, and allow room for innovation of
these intriguing technologies that a comprehensive federal licensure and supervision
scheme might not allow as well. Furthermore, having prudential regulation should
contribute to the confidence among users – whether consumers or businesses – that their
stored value is safe and that their transactions will be executed as expected.
The split between prudential money transmission regulation by the States, and
anti-money laundering and economic sanctions/ anti-terrorism regulations by the
Department of the Treasury reflects a robust regulatory, supervision and examination
scheme for virtual currency transactions with much room on the prudential side of State
regulation to promote product innovation without sacrificing important protections for
users or, on the federal side, anti-money laundering (AML) or economic sanctions goals.
Some advocate for a single, federal scheme of licensure and regulation of virtual
currencies and their providers. The proponents of this view should be careful what they
wish for: they could find themselves unable to qualify for a federal license as the efforts
of certain retailers to obtain approval from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for
their industrial loan operations (even after they had obtained a state ILC charter) or
national bank or federal savings and loan charters. These federal approvals are also
expensive and time-consuming processes with considerable discretion left to regulators to
reject applicants. It is not clear to me that early applicants will enjoy the relief from 50state regulation that they seem to expect.
Some individuals will not adopt payment methods they do not understand and
whose rules of the road are not transparent. Thus, we should appreciate the longstanding
role the States have played in innovating regulations that have encouraged users to adopt
new payments methods. The work of the Uniform Law Commissioners and American
Law Institute, begun more than 65 years ago, created the uniform and predictable
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) that State Legislatures enacted. The
UCC’s predominance in payments regulation is now complemented by payments systems
rules and bilateral agreements, including those that govern transactions that the UCC
does not address, as well as limited federal laws and regulations. Federal regulations also
may prompt faster user adoptions of new technologies, as many believe the Fair Credit
Billing Act (FCBA) and the Electronic Fund Transfers Act (EFTA) did in the late 1960’s
and 1970’s, respectively, even though the EFTA has been criticized for chilling certain
ATM developments.
6

Recommendation 2: Make providers of virtual currencies comply with the
customer-identification program and AML compliance program requirements of
Sections 326 and 352 of the USA PATRIOT Act, and with the economic
sanctions regulations enforced by OFAC, just as other payments systems
providers do. Virtual currency customers will have to reveal their identities to
issuers or transaction intermediaries of the currencies they use. They should get
the same federal financial privacy rights that users of other payments products
have under the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 and Title V of the GrammLeach-Bliley Act.
My concern is that disintermediation of payments – the separation of payment
flows from the comprehensive record-keeping and retention requirements applicable to
payments that eventually flow through the banking system – makes it more difficult to
determine the identities of senders and recipients of payments. This may contribute to
the efficacy of the “layering” stage of money laundering, the passage of the funds or
credits through so many hands that the identities of payments participants is obscured.
This is an important concern for anti-money-laundering, anti-terrorism, anti-proliferation,
and anti-tax-avoidance purposes.
Recommendation 3: Encourage FinCEN to clarify the manner in which
customer-identification and AML compliance requirements apply to virtual
currencies to a greater degree if that is needed to stop banks from discontinuing
their business relationships with virtual currency providers and other payments
innovators. If banks cannot determine how to comply with FinCEN regulations,
for example, they will cut off payments innovators before the innovators can
attract investors and users to make it to the second-stage distributed computing
and database technologies their current work may generate.
Depository institutions deserve the clearest guidance on how customeridentification and AML compliance requirements apply to virtual currencies. This is one
of the few ways in which we can stop the recent spate of terminations of banking
relationships with providers of virtual currencies – colloquially called “bank
discontinuance.”
Without the clearest possible guidance available for banks and investors, we are
likely to experience a domestic decline in innovations and the potential loss of
development of future associated uses of the distributed computing and database
technologies such as for tracking tangible goods transactions or even in tracking and
trading intangibles such as electronic mortgages and other evidences of equity or debt.
Moreover, if bitcoins or other virtual currencies prove to garner even more widespread
international adoptions, the United States will want to have a share of the productive
research and applications capacity in the United States and may regret actions that send it
offshore. 8 This would be even more important if distributed technologies developing in
8

For a valuable discussion of the regulation of virtual currencies from the perspective of the European
Central Bank, see Virtual Currency Schemes, supra note 6. This study does not accurately reflect the
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the next five years that would not suffer the perceived disadvantages of bitcoins today
were to emerge.
On the other hand, we should not condone the virtual currency systems that
market the anonymity of their users or claim immunity from otherwise applicable
compliance responsibilities in the name of “innovation.” If proponents of virtual
currencies want access to profits for transactions in the United States, they should be
prepared to comply with applicable laws, and, in specific, they should obtain sufficient
information from customers to enable them to respond to properly authorized requests for
access from federal or state regulators and law enforcement agencies.
A corollary of this recommendation involves providing financial privacy rights to
users of virtual payments systems equal to those provided to users of more traditional
payment systems. In the United States, two functionally different, federal financial
privacy statutes should govern virtual currency transactions – the Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978, which governs access to account and transaction information of
individuals and businesses by the federal government, and Title V (Privacy) of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Act of 1999, which governs how providers of
consumer financial products and services may use and share the non-public, personally
identifiable information they hold, including with their functional or prudential regulators
and with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. It is unclear that participants
in virtual currency systems are enjoying these rights today. As banks increasingly buy
providers of digital currencies to develop their own products, it is even clearer that
customers should enjoy the same financial privacy protections, including due process
rights, however limited they may be with border seizures and other Title 18 forfeiture
provisions.

current state of regulation of virtual currencies in the United States in two respects. First, it ignores the
presence of state prudential regulation of “money transmitters.” Also, it fails to reflect the fact that widely
used payments systems here have already moved away from reliance on “payments laws” and towards
system rules and bilateral agreements for processing payments. These system rules and bilateral
agreements often augment laws that otherwise apply to the underlying form of payment being used, but in
other cases they provide uniformity and certainty to forms of payments that neither federal or state laws
comprehensively govern (credit cards, electronic fund transfers, and certain aspects of payroll cards, for
example).
The Bank’s report mentions a case in which French “banks shut down the currency exchange facility for
accounts handling [bitcoins], on the presumption that Bitcoin should conform to electronic money
regulations. Id. at 43, citing Finextra:http://www.finextra.comnews.fullstory.aspx?newscemid=22921.
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Recommendation 4: Encourage payments systems innovators to adopt and
publicize payment systems rules for their own systems and even to compete for
customers on the basis of the system rules they adopt.
Whenever a consumer or business prepares to make or receive a payment it will
want to have certainty that:
● the payment is authorized by the person from whose funds or credits the
payment will be made,
● the person has sufficient funds or credits for the payment processor to deliver
those funds on time to the payee/ recipient so that the payee/ recipient will receive “goods
funds” instantly or in a reasonable period of time,
● the payment is made to the proper payee and in the time frame specified or
expected by the person whose funds or credits are being used or consistently with any
applicable contract between the obligor and payee,
● the payment, from the obligee’s perspective, will become final at a specified
time or after a specified interval and, from the obligor’s perspective, that it will discharge
the underlying obligation to pay for goods or services or to retire a debt.
● the payment has integrity – that is, the named payee/ recipient has not been
altered, the amount has not been lowered or raised, or the funds will not be held up
unreasonably in transit.
These are “regulatory” or system rule qualities that will allow the provider to maintain
users’ trust.
Additionally, every person or business that stores funds or other value with a bank or
broker – or in this case with the issuer, exchange or other provider/ participant in a virtual
currency transaction – wants suitable assurances that they can redeem/ retrieve their
funds or value when they want to do so. This issue surfaced with bitcoins when the
federal government froze some bank accounts belonging to the Mt. Gox Exchange and
the Exchange was unable to pay holders of bitcoins when they sought to redeem value
stored in bitcoins. Other issues related to value storage include whether any form of
insurance against the insolvency of the issuer or exchange is available to protect those
who deposit value or otherwise hold accounts that they have reasonable expectations to
redeem on little or no notice, or even on predictable terms.
Some virtual currencies have attracted negative publicity, including recent publicity
about the disappearance of a Bitcoin exchange based in China with $4.1 million of value
that belonged to others. This type of negative publicity stands in the way of broader
adoption of virtual currencies.
Prudential regulation and transparent system operating rules should help legitimate
businesses offering virtual currencies attract more customers – assuming we have no
reason today to fear competition for legal tender from current-day virtual currencies.
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I encourage virtual currency issuers to create payment systems rules for their own
systems and harbor some hope that issuers will compete to offer system rules that match
the needs of the individuals and businesses who participate. Payment systems rules
often precede full government regulations by long periods of time. Examples include
traveler’s cheques and bank wire transfers, and more recently automated clearing house
transactions governed by the National Automated Clearing House Association and
electronic checking processing systems that use ECCHO Operating Rules. New
payments methodologies regulated too soon often do not receive the same levels of
innovations. The primary example I can cite was based on a report by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System following the enactment and implementation of
the Electronic Fund Transfers Act in the late 1970’s. The alternative to provider-created
system rules may be more government regulation. This gives providers a choice between
self-regulation for these specific customer protection purposes or more government
regulation. I imagine they will give self-regulation careful consideration.
Payments systems that have not established transparent and uniform system rules
normally suffer a worse fate: so few individuals or businesses will use them that they
wither for lack of investors and of income. This happened to some extent in the United
States to early offerors of “electronic money,” including Mondex and Digicash, despite
talented senior management and significant investments. Consumers did not adopt them
so merchants did not adopt them – in part because neither group was certain of their
rights if they adopted them.
Recommendation 5: Ignore the claims that any regulation of virtual currencies
will halt innovations or that innovators deserve freedom from regulations that
apply to other payments systems and their providers, and their wishes for a single
federal licensure system.
I urge Members to resist the “we’re new so don’t regulate us at all” arguments that
you’ve heard since the advent of electronic commerce. Payments are payments and
stored value is value storage. The “don’t regulate us or you will stifle innovation”
arguments did not persuade many as digital money, prepaid cards, payroll cards and other
new products appeared in markets and they offer no reason to abandon existing
prudential regulation now.
There also is no reason to reward “innovators” with freedom from regulations with
which their “real world” competitors must comply. That would provide anti-competitive
advantages to certain new entrants for which no justification appears.
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Recommendation 6: Monitor the development of virtual currency providers in
case they transform their products into commodities or securities and, if this
happens, then decide whether regulating their products under the applicable
regulations makes more sense.
Bitcoins’ values have been highly volatile over the past year. This volatility looks
like price volatility associated with commodities and securities; bitcoin prices seemingly
move separately from the values of the world’s major currencies. If other virtual
currencies demonstrate this market freedom from legal tender currencies, this may be the
signal that a reconsideration of type of regulation to be applied from regulation as
payment systems to regulation as commodities or securities.
Recommendation 7: Leave room for non-depository and depository providers of
payments products to innovate in the virtual currency space.
It is important not to rush new laws or regulations following negative publicity from a
new technology when existing laws regulate issuers prudentially and clarity in
enforcement of AML regulations can allow some space for innovators in the virtual
currency space. I was delighted to read last week that the New York State Department of
Financial Services was considering offering a BitLicense. Careful development of
licensure standards will help develop stable payments products. As I have mentioned,
virtual currency technologies can produce secondary, distributed computing and database
applications that could yield enormous benefits to domestic and cross-border commerce.
Recommendation 8: Ask for a study of virtual currencies to be carried out by the
Federal Reserve Board or the Department of the Treasury or fund a study
pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committees Act by an inter-agency task force
and industry participants.
The subcommittees sponsoring today’s hearing should ask for a study by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or the Department of the Treasury of
virtual currencies, the potential for innovations and efficiencies they may offer more
broadly, and the kinds of risks – to price stability, financial stability, payment system
stability, reputational risks and for users – identified in an October 2012 report by the
European Central Bank entitled “Virtual Currency Schemes.” 9
Another option is for Congress to authorize and separately fund an inter-agency
working group to produce a study of how the various federal agencies involved in
payments, regulating of banking, commodities, securities and law enforcement.
Regardless of which agency leads the study, the work should be organized under
the Federal Advisory Committees Act so that all industry segments can be included.

9

Supra, note 6. For more information about this report, see supra, note 8.
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Part IV: Responses to Other Questions Posed by the Committee
A. Issues implicated in cross-border payments and cross-border trade and
finance
Monetary policy is one of the concerns cited by the European Central Bank in its
2012 report on Virtual Currency Schemes. But that report did not discuss enforcement of
collateralized debt obligations.
Virtual currency transactions could render finance transactions non-transparent so
that current and potential providers of financing might not be able to ascertain their
relative priorities to assets that underlie those trade transactions. The United States will
want to follow closely developments that frustrate creditors’ claims to inventory or other
assets if the obligor fails to complete payments for goods that it has purchased here or
abroad.
The trend away from bank-issued letters of credit to supply-chain financing not
involving banks – indeed including financing provided by logistics suppliers – has not yet
degraded the ability of sellers, buyers or their financers to monitor cross-border trade
transactions. This may be because logistics suppliers of supply-chain finance enjoy hardearned reputations as honest participants delivering the goods they carry and collecting
payments if required on behalf of senders. But the potential for trade finance disruption
still exists.
B. Possible regulatory models for providers of payments products and
systems
In addition to the current state prudential regulation of virtual currency providers
and to Treasury’s comprehensive registration, AML and economic sanctions regulations
applicable to money services businesses, we have a number of potential models for
regulating, requiring registration or supervising and examining providers of virtual
currencies. I mention these more for future purposes than for any need I perceive at this
point, but the eventual use of alternative regulatory models depends in large measure on
how the products offered as “virtual currencies” work in fact.
For example, state prudential regulation of money transmitters is framed to ensure
that competent transaction execution. Those who take funds from one person with a
promise to deliver them to a second person need to have the capacity to do just what they
promise – to pay in the manner, in the time, and to the person that the first person
instructed them to pay.
Prudential regulation by states establishes qualifications for providers –
depository and non-depository providers they license to do business with their own
residents, and establishes a system of reserves or bonds or both so that funds will be
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available to complete transactions on those persons’ parts. 10 State licensing and bonding
requirements are cited by many entrepreneurs as a reason why virtual currencies are not
attracting the widespread uses and investor funding that entrepreneurs seek. However,
without these state requirements, the prospect of value disappearing – as it apparently has
with the disappearance of the bitcoin exchange in China – likely would rise and injure
users of these products.
State prudential regulation began in the late 18th Century when Massachusetts
and New Hampshire prohibited unincorporated banks from operating. 11 New York State
followed them with its prohibition in 1804. Some states banned banking – period. These
included Texas until 1904, and Iowa, Arkansas, Oregon and California before the Civil
War. State laws also established “safety deposit” systems and have regulated them. Items
in safety deposit boxes are not immune from asset freeze orders issued by courts, or
seizure by the IRS. States have been regulating money transmitters since the advent of
the telegraph.
The regulation of safe-storage systems is even more ancient, beginning with the
Knights Templar and Vatican as lenders in the pre-and early Renaissance periods, and
with the Silver Vaults in London and lenders in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Florence
whose services contributed to the early Renaissance flows of commerce and modern
trade. I mention safety deposit systems because of the similarities they have, and that
their predecessors had, to products such as e-Gold, and even bitcoins. Some of these
contemporary products are more like commodities to be bartered than they are true
“currencies.” 12
Alternative regulatory schemes for virtual currencies include commodities and
securities regulation. The securities model offers advantages such as registration and
requirements for disclosing material events that may affect the value of the security or the
health of its issuer.
One reason to consider commodities or securities regulatory schemes for virtual
currencies that do not track the movements of legal tender currencies is evidence that
investors are speculating in these currencies. To the extent that virtual currencies seem to
be used more for speculative purposes and less for transaction execution, the nonpayments models of regulations present feasible alternatives.

10

This system has features of fractional reserves that our banking system depends on, as well as of bonding
or comparable requirements to ensure completion of transactions in the event of provider failure. The
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System also establishes reserve requirements for depository
institutions on an annual basis, in Regulation D.
11
For a brief discussion of this period in bank and payments regulation in the United States, see Broome &
Markham, supra, note 2 at 1-28.
12
Francois R. Velde, Bitcoin: A primer, CHIC. FED LETTER No. 317 (Dec. 2013) (copy on file with the
witness) (describes the operations of bitcoins and, particularly, its unique methods for controlling two
challenges of digital money – controlling the creation and avoiding duplication of units).
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V. Conclusion
I applaud the Subcommittees for holding this important hearing and urge them to
continue to watch developments in virtual currencies. Thank you again, Chairman
Merkley and Chairman Warner, and Ranking Members Heller and Kirk, for this
opportunity to share my views with your Subcommittees. I will be pleased to take
questions.
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